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Abstract—In this paper we formulate a contract design prob-
lem where a primary license holder wishes to profit from its
excess spectrum capacity by selling it to potential secondary
users/buyers. It needs to determine how to optimally price the
excess spectrum so as to maximize its profit, knowing that
this excess capacity is stochastic in nature, does not come
with exclusive access, and cannot provide deterministic service
guarantees to a buyer. At the same time, buyers are of different
types, characterized by different communication needs, tolerance
for the channel uncertainty, and so on, all of which a buyer’s
private information. The license holder must then try to design
different contracts catered to different types of buyers in order
to maximize its profit. We address this problem by adopting as
a reference a traditional spectrum market where the buyer can
purchase exclusive access with fixed/deterministic guarantees. We
fully characterize the optimal solution in the cases where there
is a single buyer type, and when multiple types of buyers share
the same, known channel condition as a result of the primary
user activity. In the most general case we construct a algorithm
that generates a set of contracts in a computationally efficient
manner, and show that this set is optimal when the buyer types
satisfy a monotonicity condition.
I. INTRODUCTION
The scarcity of spectrum resources and the desire to im-
prove spectrum efficiency have led to extensive research and
development in recent years in such concepts as dynamic
spectrum access/sharing, open access, and secondary (spot
or short-term) spectrum market, see e.g., [1], [2]. From the
inception of the open access paradigm, it was clear that for it
to work two issues must be adequately addressed: sensing and
pricing. The first refers to the ability of a (secondary) device
to accurately detect channel opportunity and more generally to
acquire information on the spectrum environment. The second
refers to mechanisms that provide license holders with the
right incentives so that they will willingly allow access by
unlicensed devices.
There has been a number of mechanisms proposed to
address this incentive issue, the most often used being the
auction mechanism, see e.g., [3]–[5]. Auction is also the
primary mechanism used in allocating spectrum on the primary
market [6]. In this paper we consider an alternative approach,
that based on contracts, to the trading of spectrum access
on the secondary market (see Section VI on a discussion
comparing the two mechanisms). This is conceptually not
unlike the design of pricing plans by a cellular operator: it
presents a potential user with a set of contract options, each
consisting of parameters including the duration of the contract,
discount on the device, number of free minutes per month,
price per minute for those over the free limit, window of
unlimited calling time, and so on. In coming up with these
calling plans the operator typically studies carefully the types
of callers it wants to attract and their calling patterns/habits;
the subsequent plans are catered to these patterns with the
objective of maximizing its revenue. A caller interested in
entering into contract with the operator is expected to look
through these plans and pick one that is the best suited for
him/her needs.
In this paper we adopt such a contract design approach
in the context of the secondary spectrum market, where a
license holder advertises a set of prices and service plans
in the hope that a potential buyer will find one of them
sufficiently appealing to enter into contract. The contracts are
designed with the goal of maximizing the expected revenue of
the license holder given a set of buyer types (more precisely
defined in the next section).
To make the contracts appealing to a buyer, one must
address the issue that the spectrum offered on the secondary
(short-term) market is typically the excess capacity due to the
primary license holder’s own spectrum under-utilization. Its
quality is therefore often uncontrolled and random, both spa-
tially and temporally, and strongly dependent on the behavior
of the primary users. The primary license holder can of course
choose to eliminate the randomness by setting aside resources
(e.g., bandwidth) exclusively for secondary users. This will
however likely impinge on its current users and may not be in
the interest of its primary business model. The alternative is to
simply give non-exclusive access to secondary users for a fee,
which allows the secondary users to share a certain amount of
bandwidth simultaneously with its existing licensed users, but
only under certain conditions on the primary traffic/spectrum
usage. For instance, a secondary user is given access but can
only use the bandwidth if the current activity by the licensed
users is below a certain level, e.g., as measured by received
SNR, the so-called spectrum overlay. Many spectrum sharing
schemes proposed in the literature fall under this scenario, see
e.g., [7]–[10].
In this case a secondary user pays (either in the form of
money or services in return) to gain spectrum access but not
for guaranteed use of the spectrum. This presents a challenge
to both the primary and the secondary users: On one hand, the
secondary user must assess its needs and determine whether
the uncertainty in spectrum quality is worth the price asked
2for and what level of uncertainty can be tolerated. On the
other hand, the primary must decide how stochastic service
quality should be priced so as to remain competitive against
guaranteed (or deterministic) services which the secondary
user may be able to purchase from a traditional market or
a different primary license holder.
To address this challenge we adopt a reference point in the
form of a traditional spectrum market from where a secondary
user can purchase guaranteed service, i.e., exclusive access
rights to certain bandwidth, at a fixed price per unit. This
makes it possible for the secondary user to reject the offer from
the primary if it is risk-averse or if the primary’s offer is not
attractive. This also implies that the price per unit of bandwidth
offered by the primary user must reflect its stochastic quality.
Work most relevant to the study presented in this paper
includes [11], [12]. In [11] a contract problem is studied where
the secondary users help relay primary user’s data and in return
are allowed to send their own data. In [12] an optimal portfolio
problem is studied, where a secondary user can purchase a
bundle of different stochastic channels, with the price of each
already determined, and seeks to find the optimal purchase.
Main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We formulate a contract design problem where the spec-
trum license holder seeks to sell his excess bandwidth
to potential buyers. The model captures the following
essential features: (1) excess bandwidth on the secondary
spectrum market often comes with non-exclusive use
and therefore highly uncertain channel conditions; (2)
incentives are built in for both the seller and the buyer
to conduct spectrum trading on the secondary market.
2) We fully characterize the optimal set of contracts the
seller should provide in the case of a single or two types
of buyers, and when multiple types of buyers share the
same channel condition due to primary user activities.
3) When there are multiple types of buyers and each
experiences different channel conditions, we construct
a computationally efficient algorithm and show that the
set of contracts it generates is optimal when the buyer
types satisfy a monotonicity condition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
present the contract design problem in Section II. Section III
characterizes the utility region and the optimal contract in
the single buyer case. Section IV deals with the case when
the channel condition is common knowledge, while Section
V focuses on the case when channel conditions are private
knowledge. Discussion is given in Section VI and numerical
results in Section VII.
II. MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section we describe in detail the models for the two
parties under the contract framework: the seller and the buyer,
and their considerations in designing and accepting a contract,
respectively. We also illustrate a basic idea underlying our
model to capture the value of secondary spectrum service,
which is random and non-guaranteed in nature, by using
guaranteed service as a reference.
There are two parties to a contract, the seller and the buyer.
The seller is also referred to as the owner or the primary
license holder, who uses the spectrum to provide business and
service to its primary users, and carry primary traffic. He is
willing to sell whatever underutilized bandwidth he has as long
as it generates positive profit and does not impact negatively
his primary business. We will assume that the seller can pre-
design up to M contracts and announce them to potential
buyers. If a buyer accepts one of the contracts, they come
to an agreement and they have to follow the contract up to
a predetermined period of time. We will leave this duration
unspecified as it does not affect our analysis under the current
model.
Each contract is in the form of a pair of real numbers (x, p),
where x ∈ R+ and p ∈ R+.
• x is the amount of bandwidth they agree to trade on (i.e.,
access to this amount of bandwidth is given from the
seller to buyer).
• p is the price per unit of x; thus a total of xp is paid to
the seller if the buyer purchases this contract.
The seller’s profit or utility from contract (x, p) is given as
U(x, p) = x(p− c)
where c is a predetermined constant that takes into account the
operating cost of the seller. We will assume that any contract
the seller presents must be such that p > c; that is, the seller
will not sell at a loss. If none of the contracts is accepted
by the buyer, the reserve utility of the owner is defined by
U(0, 0) = 0.
We next consider what a contract specified by the pair
(x, p) means to a potential buyer. To see this, we will assume
that there exists a traditional (as opposed to this emerging,
secondary) market from where the buyer can purchase services
with fixed or deterministic guarantees. What this means is
that the buyer can purchase exclusive use of certain amount
of bandwidth, which does not have to be shared with other
(primary) users. This serves as an alternative to the buyer, and
is used in our model as a point of reference. We will not
specify how the price of exclusive use is set, and will simply
normalize it to be unit price per unit of bandwidth (or per unit
of transmission rate). The idea is that given this alternative,
the seller cannot arbitrarily set his price because the buyer can
always walk away and purchase from this traditional market.
This traditional market will also be referred to as the reference
market, and the service it offers as the fixed or deterministic
service. Our model allows a buyer to purchase from both
markets should that be in the interest of the buyer. Note that
even though we have assumed a single seller model, this is not
a monopoly because of the existence of this reference market.
However, we do not explicitly model the competition between
multiple sellers on the secondary market, which remains an
interesting subject of future study.
When the set of M contracts are presented to a buyer, his
choices are (1) to choose one of the contracts and abide by
its terms, (2) to reject all contracts and go to the traditional
3market, and (3) to purchase a certain combination from both
markets. The buyer’s goal is to minimize his purchasing cost
as long as certain quality constraints are satisfied.
While the framework presented here applies to any mean-
ingful quality constraint, to make our discussion concrete
below we will focus on a loss constraint. Suppose the buyer
chooses to purchase y units of fixed service from the reference
market together with a contract (x, p). Then its constraint on
expected loss of transmission can be expressed as:
E[(q − y − xB)+] ≤ ǫ ,where
• q is the amount of data/traffic the buyer wishes to
transmit.
• B ∈ {0, 1} is a binary random variable denoting the
quality of the channel for this buyer. We will denote
b := P (B = 1).
• ǫ is a threshold on the expected loss acceptable to the
buyer.
Note that quantities x, y and q are of the same unit; this
unit can be bit (total amount of transmission), or rate (bits
per second), and so on. Here we have adopted a simplifying
assumption that the purchased service (in the amount of x) is
either available in the full amount (when B = 1) or unavailable
(when B = 0), with xb being the expected availability. If the
contract duration is comparable to the time constant of the
primary user activity (e.g., peak vs. off-peak hours) then this
model captures the spectrum condition at the time of contract
signing. More sophisticated models can be adopted here, by
replacing xB with another random variable X(x) denoting the
random amount of data transmission the buyer can actually
realize.
With a purchase of (y, (x, p)), the buyer’s cost is given by
y + xp. The cost of the contract (x, p) to this buyer is given
by the value of the following minimization problem:
C(x, p) = minimize
y
y + xp (1)
subject to E[(q − y − xB)+] ≤ ǫ (2)
That is, to assess how much this contract actually costs him,
the buyer has to consider how much additional fixed service
he needs to purchase to fulfill his needs.
The buyer can always choose to not enter into any of the
presented contracts and only purchase from the traditional
market. In this case, his cost is given by the value of the
following minimization problem:
C(0, 0) = minimize
y
y, subject to E[(q − y)+] ≤ ǫ
Since every term is deterministic in the above problem, we
immediately conclude that C(0, 0) = q − ǫ, which will be
referred to as the reserve price of the buyer. It is natural to
assume that any buyer must be such that q ≥ ǫ, for otherwise
the buyer does not need to perform any transmission as it can
tolerate the loss of all of its data.
In deciding whether to accept a given contract (x, p), the
buyer has to consider (1) whether the contract would satisfy its
quality (loss) constraint, and (2) whether there is an incentive
to enter into this contract, i.e., whether the cost of this
contract is no higher than the reserve price. The latter is
also referred to as the individual rationality (IR) constraint,
C(x, p) ≤ C(0, 0) = q − ǫ. Any contract that satisfies both
constraints of a buyer is referred to as acceptable to that buyer.
We will assume that a potential buyer may be one of a
number of different types; each type is characterized by a
unique triple (q, ǫ, b), which is a buyer’s private information.
That is, a type is characterized by its transmission needs
(amount q to be transferred and loss requirement ǫ), as well
as its perceived spectrum/channel quality (b). Throughout the
paper we will assume that a type (q, ǫ, b) is such that there
exists a contract with p > c acceptable to the buyer, for
otherwise the seller has no incentive to sell.
We will further assume two cases, where b is common to
all types and where b may be different for different types.
The first case models the scenario where buyers are relatively
homogeneous and their perceived channel quality is largely
determined by the primary user traffic reflected in b. In this
case it is also natural to assume that b is known to the seller.
The second case models the scenario where buyers may differ
significantly in their location, quality of transceiver devices,
and so on, which leads to different perceived channel quality,
which is only known to a buyer himself.
The seller is assumed to know the distribution of the types
but not the actual type of a particular buyer. Specifically, we
will assume there are K types of buyers, and a buyer is of
type i with probability ri and is given by the triple (qi, bi, ǫi).
Continuous type distribution is discussed in Section VI. In
subsequent sections we proceed in the following sequence:
(1) single user type, (2) multiple user types; common b, and
(3) multiple user types; different and private b. Due to space
limit, we omit some proofs and offer intuitive explanations
instead. Complete proofs can be found in [13].
III. OPTIMAL CONTRACT FOR A SINGLE BUYER TYPE
We begin by considering the case where there is only one
type of buyer (q, ǫ, b). Through this simplified scenario we
will introduce a number of concepts key to our analysis and
obtain some basic understanding of the nature of this problem.
Under our assumption that the seller knows the buyer type
distribution, having a single type (i.e., a singleton distribution)
essentially means that the triple (q, ǫ, b) is known to the seller.
Denote by T = {(x, p) : C(x, p) ≤ C(0, 0)} the set of all
acceptable contracts for the buyer, or the acceptance region.
This is characterized by the next result.
Theorem 1. When q(1− b) ≤ ǫ, the buyer accepts a contract
(x, p) iff
p ≤
{
b if x ≤ q−ǫ
b
q−ǫ
x
if x > q−ǫ
b
. (3)
When q(1− b) > ǫ, the buyer accepts the contract iff
p ≤
{
b if x ≤ ǫ1−b
bǫ
x(1−b) if x > ǫ1−b
. (4)
4The above theorem can be proved for each of the cases
listed above. For brevity below we only show the proof for
the sufficient condition under q(1 − b) ≤ ǫ for the first case
in Eqn (3); other cases can be done using similar arguments.
Lemma 1. When q(1− b) ≤ ǫ, the buyer accepts the contract
(x, p) if x ≤ q−ǫ
b
and p ≤ b.
Proof: If both the IR constraint and the loss constraint are
satisfied under the stated conditions, then the buyer accepts
the contract. Below we check these two constraints. Let the
buyer supplement this contract with an additional purchase of
y = q−ǫ−xp deterministic service. Note that y ≥ 0 under the
stated conditions. The total cost of this contract to the buyer
is then given by:
C(x, p) = y + xp = q − ǫ − xp+ xp = q − ǫ = C(0, 0).
The IR constraint is therefore satisfied. The buyer’s loss under
this combination of purchases is given by:
E [(q − y − xB)+]
= (q − y − x)+b+ (q − y)+(1− b)
= (ǫ+ xp− x)+b+ (ǫ+ xp)(1 − b)
=


(ǫ + xp)(1− b) ≤ (ǫ+ b q−ǫ
b
)(1 − b)
= q(1− b) ≤ ǫ, if ǫ+ x(p− 1) ≤ 0
(ǫ + x(p− 1))b+ (ǫ+ xp)(1 − b)
= ǫ+ x(p− b) ≤ ǫ, if ǫ + x(p− 1) > 0
Thus the loss constraint is also satisfied.
The two acceptance regions given by Theorem 1 are illus-
trated in Figs. 1. Any contract that falls below the boundary
is acceptable to the buyer. The two cases have the following
interpretation. In the first case when q(1− b) ≤ ǫ, the quality
of the stochastic channel is sufficiently good such that the
loss constraint (2) may be met without any purchase of the
deterministic channel. In this case the buyer is willing to spend
up to the entire reserve price C(0, 0) = q−ǫ on the contract. In
the second case when q(1−b) > ǫ, the quality of the stochastic
channel is such that no matter how much is purchased, some
deterministic channel is needed (y > 0) to satisfy the loss
constraint (note xp ≤ bǫ1−b < q− ǫ because q(1− b) > ǫ). For
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Fig. 1. The upper curve is when q(1− b) < ǫ(q = 5, b = 0.8, ǫ = 3), the
lower curve is when q(1 − b) < ǫ(q = 5, b = 0.3, ǫ = 3)
a given buyer type (q, ǫ, b), the seller can choose any point in
the corresponding acceptance region T to maximize its utility:
max(x,p)∈T U(x, p). We next show that the optimal contract
for the seller is given by the “knee” (the intersection point
where the straight line meets the curve) on the boundary of
the acceptance region, denoted as (x∗, p∗).
Theorem 2. The optimal contract for the seller is the inter-
section point (x∗, p∗) on the acceptance region boundary of
the buyer.
Proof: We prove the optimality in two steps. First we
show that the seller’s utility is strictly increasing in p which
implies that the optimal contract must be such that (3) and (4)
hold with strict equality. Then we show that the intersection
point is strictly better than any other point on the boundary.
For any x > 0 and ∀p′ > p, we have
U(x, p′) = x(p′ − c) > x(p− c) = U(x, p).
Thus U(x, p) is strictly increasing in p. For any x < x∗ (points
on the straight line) we have
U(x∗, p∗) = x∗(p∗ − c) > x(p∗ − c) = U(x, p∗),
which used the fact that p∗ > c. (Recall we have assumed that
for any buyer there must exist a contract with p > c that it
finds acceptable. This implies such a point must be within the
acceptance region, which in turn implies that we must have
p∗ > c since p∗ ≥ p, ∀p in the region.) For any pair (x, p)
such that xp = x∗p∗ and x > x∗ (points on the curve),
U(x, p) = x(p− c) = x∗p∗ − xc > x∗(p∗ − c) = U(x∗, p∗).
Thus U(x∗, p∗) is strictly greater than any point U(x, p) on
the boundary.
Once the seller determines the optimal contract and presents
it to the buyer, the buyer will accept because it satisfies both
the loss and the IR constraints. It can be easily shown that
the buyer’s cost in accepting is exactly C(0, 0). Note that
technically since the cost of the contract is exactly equal to
the reserve price, the buyer is ambivalent between getting only
deterministic service and getting a mix of both types of ser-
vices. In practice the seller can always lower the unit price p∗
by an arbitrarily small amount to provide a positive incentive
so that the buyer will accept the contract. For this reason even
though the costs are equal, for simplicity we will assume that
the buyer will accept this contract. For the same reason, we
will also assume that when there exist multiple contracts of
equal cost to the buyer, the seller can always induce the desired
choice from the buyer by introducing a small difference to the
desired contract. We have now a complete characterization of
the contract design for a single type of buyer. We end this
section by introducing the concept of an equal-cost line of a
buyer. Consider a contract (x′, p′). Denote by P (x′, p′, x) a
price such that the contract (x, P (x′, p′ , x)) has the same cost
as contract (x′, p′) to a buyer.
Definition 1. The equal-cost line E of a buyer of type (q, ǫ, b)
is the set of contracts within the buyer’s acceptance region T
that are of equal cost to the buyer. Thus (x, p) ∈ E if and
only if p = P (x′, p′, x) for some other (x′, p′) ∈ E. The cost
of this line is given by C(x′, p′), ∀(x′, p′) ∈ E.
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Fig. 2. Example of equal cost lines
It should be clear that there are many equal-cost lines, each
with a different cost. Figure 2 shows an example of a set of
equal-cost lines. We will therefore also write an equal-cost
line as Ex′,p′ for some (x′, p′) on the line to distinguish it
from other equal-cost lines. The next theorem gives a precise
expression for the equivalent price that characterizes an equal-
cost line.
Theorem 3. For a buyer of type (q, ǫ, b) with an intersection
point (x∗, p∗) on its acceptance region boundary, and given
a contract (x′, p′), an equal-cost line Ex′,p′ consists of all
contracts (x, P (x′, p′, x)) such that
P (x′, p′, x) =


b− x
′
x
(b− p′) if x, x′ ≤ x∗
x′p′/x if x, x′ ≥ x∗
(b(x∗ − x′) + x′p′)/x if x′ < x∗ < x
b− (x∗b− x′p′)/x if x < x∗ < x′
Proof: We will prove this for the case q(1 − b) ≤ ǫ; the
other case can be shown with similar arguments and is thus
omitted for brevity. In this case x∗ = q−ǫ
b
. When x, x′ ≤ x∗,
without buying deterministic service the loss is given by
E[(q − xB)+] = (q − x)+b+ q(1− b)
= (q − x)b + q(1− b) = q − xb ≥ ǫ,
where the second equality is due to the fact that q(1 − b) ≤
ǫ⇒ q−ǫ
b
≤ q ⇒ x ≤ q−ǫ
b
≤ q. The incentive for the buyer is
to purchase y such that the loss is just equal to ǫ.
E[(q − y − xB)+] = (q − y − x)b+ (q − y)(1− b)
= q − y − xb = ǫ .
The first equality follows from the fact that q(1 − b) ≤ ǫ,
which implies both (q − y − x) ≥ 0 and (q − y) ≥ 0. This is
true for both (x, p) and (x′, p′). Since (x, p) is on the equal
cost line Ex′,p′ , we know that C(x, p) = C(x′, p′). We also
know that C(x, p) = y + xp and C(x′, p′) = y′ + x′p′,
C(x, p) = q − ǫ− xb + xp = q − ǫ− x′b+ x′p′ = C(x′, p′) .
Rearranging the second equality such that p is a function of
x, x′, p′ immediately gives the result. When x, x′ > x∗, x (x′)
alone is sufficient to achieve the loss constraint. For C(x, p) =
C(x′, p′) we must have x′p′ = xp, resulting in the second
branch. The third and fourth branch can be directly derived
from the first two branches. When x > x∗ > x′ (x′ > x∗ < x),
we first find the equivalent price at x∗ by the first branch
(second branch), and then use the second branch (first branch)
to find P (x′, p′, x). This gives the third branch (fourth branch)
The form of the equal-cost line is the same regardless
whether q(1− b) ≤ ǫ or q(1− b) > ǫ. Note that every contract
below an equal-cost line is strictly preferable to a contract on
the line for the buyer. This is an observation we will use in
subsequent sections. We end this section with a property of
the equivalent price we will use later.
Lemma 2. P (x′, p′, x) is strictly increasing in p′ when x′ > 0.
This lemma is easily shown by noting C(x′, p′) = y +
x′p′, where y is only a function of x′. Thus, p > p′ implies
C(x′, p) > C(x′, p′) when x′ > 0.
IV. COMMON CHANNEL CONDITION
We now consider K types of buyers indexed by i =
1, 2, · · · ,K , each defined by the triple (qi, ǫi, bi) with an
associated acceptance region Ti. We will use the notation
maxi = (x
∗
i , p
∗
i ) = argmax(x,p)∈TiU(x, p)
to denote the optimal contract if type i were the only type
existing. Similarly, we will use Ci(x, p) to denote the cost to
a type-i buyer for accepting contract (x, p).
A buyer is of type i with probability ri. We assume that
the seller knows only this distribution of types but not the
actual type of a given buyer. Consequently it has to design
the contracts in a way that maximizes its expected payoff.
Since the payoff is measured in expectation, it turns out that
it does not matter whether the seller is faced with a single
buyer or multiple buyers as long as they are drawn from the
same, known type distribution and the seller has sufficient
bandwidth to honor its contracts. For this reason throughout
our discussion we will take the view of a single buyer drawn
from a certain type distribution. In Section VI we discuss the
case when the seller has limited bandwidth to trade.
Consider a set of contracts C = {(x1, p1), ..., (xK , pK)}
designed by the seller with the intention that a buyer of type
i prefers (xi, pi). This is true iff
Ci(xi, pi) ≤ Ci(xj , pj) ∀j 6= i .
Let Ri(C) denote the contract that a type-i buyer selects given
a set C. Then Ri(C) = argmin(x,p)∈C Ci(x, p) and the seller’s
expected utility for a given C is E[U(C)] =
∑
i U(Ri(C))ri
In this section we consider the case where different types
share the same channel condition bi = b, i = 1, · · · ,K , which
is also known to the seller. As mentioned earlier, this models
the case where the condition is primarily determined by the
seller’s primary user traffic. An example of the acceptance
regions of three buyer types are shown in Figure 3; note that
maxi’s need not be ordered in i. There are two possible cases:
(1) the seller can announce as many contracts as he likes (M =
K; note that there is no point in designing more contracts
than the number of types); (2) the seller is limited to at most
M < K contracts. Below we fully characterize the optimal
contract set in both cases.
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Fig. 3. Three buyer types with common b
Theorem 4. When M = K , the contract set that maximizes
the seller’s profit is (max1,max2, ...,maxK).
This result holds for the following reason. As shown in
Figure 3, with a constant b, the intersection points of all
acceptance regions are on the same line p = b. For a buyer of
type i, all points to the left of maxi on this line cost the same
as maxi, and all points to its right are outside the buyer’s
acceptance region. Therefore the type-i buyer will select the
contract maxi given this contract set (see earlier discussion on
how the seller can always incentivize this contract over others
with equal cost). Since this is the best the seller can do with a
type-i buyer (see Theorem 3) this set is optimal for the seller.
It is also relatively straightforward to obtain a similar results
in the case of M < K given next.
Lemma 3. When M < K and ∀bi = b, the optimal contract
set is a subset of (max1, ...,maxK).
Proof: Assume the optimal contract C is not a subset
of (max1, ...,maxK). Then it must consists of some contract
points from at least one of the Ii regions as demonstrated in
Figure 3. Let these contracts be Ai ⊂ Ii and
⋃
iAi = C. For
each non-empty Ai, we replace it by the contract maxi and
call this new contract set C′. The proof is to show that this
contract set generates profit at least as large as the original one.
For each type-i buyer that picked some contract (x, p) ∈ Aj
from the optimal contract C, it must had a type greater than
or equal to j otherwise (x, p) is not in its acceptance region.
In the contract set C′, type-i will now pick maxj or maxl
with l > j. The choice of each possible type of buyer picks
from C′ is at least as profitable as the one they picked from
C. Thus, the expected profit of C′ is at least as good as C.
This lemma suggests the following iterative way of finding
the optimal contract set without having to solve what would
seem like a combinatorial problem. Define function g(m, i)
as the the maximum expected profit for the seller by picking
contract maxi and selecting optimally m − 1 contracts from
the set (maxi+1, ...,maxK). Note that if we include maxi and
maxj (i < j) in the contract set but nothing else in between
i and j, then a buyer of type l (i ≤ l < j) will pick contract
maxi. These types contribute to an expected profit of x∗i (b−
c)
∑j−1
l=i rl. At the same time, no types below i will select
maxi (as it is outside their acceptance regions), and no types at
or above j will select maxi (as for them maxj is preferable).
0 5 100
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
bandwidth (x)
pri
ce
 (p) I4
I3
max1
max2
G
I1
I2
0 5 100
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
bandwidth (x)
pri
ce
 (p)
I1
I3
I2
max1
max2
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The function g(m, i) can be recursively obtained as follows:
g(m, i) = max
j:i<j≤K−m+2
g(m− 1, j) + x∗i (b− c)
j−1∑
l=i
rl,
with the boundary condition g(1, i) = x∗i (b− c)
∑K
l=i rl.
Finally, it should be clear that the maximum expected
profit for the seller is given by max1≤i≤K g(M, i), and the
optimal contract set can be determined by going backwards:
first determine i∗M = argmax1≤i≤K g(M, i), then i∗M−1 =
argmax1≤i≤K−1 g(M − 1, i), and so on.
Theorem 5. The set {maxi∗
1
,maxi∗
2
, · · · ,maxi∗
M
} obtained
using the above procedure is optimal and its expected profit
is given by g(M, i∗M ).
V. PRIVATE CHANNEL CONDITION
We now consider multiple buyer types each with a different
channel condition bi, i = 1, · · · ,K . We will start with the
special case of K = 2 and characterize the optimal contracts
in this case. Using these results we then construct an algorithm
to compute a set of contracts for the case of K ≥ 2.
A. Two buyer types: K = 2
Consider two buyer types (qi, ǫi, bi), i = 1, 2, with proba-
bility ri, r1+ r2 = 1. We first consider the case that the seller
is limited to one contract: M = 1.
Theorem 6. The optimal contract when K = 2 and M = 1
is as follows:
1) If max1 /∈ T2 and max2 /∈ T1,
optimal =


max1 if r1U(max1) ≥ r2U(max2)
and r1U(max1) ≥ U(G)
max2 if r2U(max2) ≥ r1U(max1)
and r2U(max2) ≥ U(G)
G if U(G) ≥ r2U(max2)
and U(G) ≥ r1U(max1)
where G denotes the intersecting point between accep-
tance region boundaries of the two types.
2) If max1 ∈ T2.
optimal =
{
max1 if U(max1) ≥ r2U(max2)
max2 if r2U(max2) ≥ U(max1)
3) If max2 ∈ T1.
optimal =
{
max2 if U(max2) ≥ r1U(max1)
max1 if r1U(max1) ≥ U(max2)
7The above result is illustrated in Figure 4 and can be argued
by showing the profit of every contract in a particular region
(such as I1) is no greater than some specific contract (such
as max1). Take the case max1 /∈ T2 and max2 /∈ T1 for
example, any point in I3 is suboptimal to point G because
any contract in I3 is acceptable by both types of buyers, but
G has a strictly higher profit than any other point in I3.
We now consider the case M = 2. We shall see that
providing multiple contracts can help the obtain higher profits.
Theorem 7. In the case of M = 2, max1 /∈ T2 and max2 /∈
T1, the optimal contract set is {max1,max2}.
Proof: The set C = {max1,max2} gives an expected
payoff of
E[U(C)] = r1U(R1(C)) + r2U(R2(C)))
= r1U(R1(max1)) + r2U(R2(max2)).
The second equality holds because max1 /∈ T2 and max2
/∈ T1 and thus type i will pick maxi. Suppose C is not the
optimal set of 2 contracts, then there must exists some C′ =
{(x1, p1), (x2, p2)} such that
E[U((C′))] = r1U(R1(x1, p1)) + r2U(R2(x2, p2))
> E[U(C)]
= r1U(R1(max1)) + r2U(R2(max2))
This implies either U(R1(x1, p1)) > U(R1(max1)), or
U(R2(x2, p2)) > U(R2(max2)), or both, all of which con-
tradict the definition of maxi. Thus, {max1,max2} is the
optimal contract set.
The proof as well as the intuition behind the above result
are straightforward. The next case, M = 2, max1 ∈ T2 or
max2 ∈ T1, is more complicated. Without loss of generality,
we will assume that the type-1 buyer has a smaller b1 (b1 ≤
b2), thus max1 ∈ T2. We first determine the optimal contract
when x∗1 ≤ x∗2; this result is then used for the case when x∗1 >
x∗2. Without loss of optimality we consider only contract pairs
{(x1, p1), (x2, p2)} where type-i buyer picks (xi, pi) instead
of the other one.
To find the optimal contract, we 1) first show that for each
(x1, p1) we can express the optimal (x2, p2) in terms of x1 and
p1; 2) then we show that (x1, p1) must be on the boundary of
T1 with x1 ≤ x∗1; 3) using 1) and 2) we optimize the expected
profit over possible choices of x1.
Lemma 4. When K = 2, if max1 ∈ T2 and x∗1 ≤ x∗2, then
given a contract for type-1 (x1, p1), the optimal contract for
type-2 must be (x∗2, P2(x1, p1, x∗2)).
Proof: Given a contract (x1, p1), the feasible region for
the contract of type-2 buyer is the area below P2(x1, p1, x) as
defined in Theorem 3 (see Figure 5). Since the seller’s profit
is increasing in both p and x, the contract that generates the
highest profit is at x2 = x∗2 and p2 = P2(x1, p1, x∗2).
Lemma 5. When K = 2, if max1 ∈ T2 and x∗1 ≤ x∗2, an
optimal contract for type-1 must be p1 = b1 and x1 ≤ x∗1.
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This lemma suggests that the optimal contract for type-1
lies on the straight line portion of its boundary; this can be
shown using proof by contradiction. Using Lemmas 4, 5 and
Theorem 3, the expected profit can be expressed as follows.
Proof: Lemma 5 can be proved in two steps. First we
assume the optimal contract has (x1, p1) ∈ T1, where we
can increase p1 by some positive δ > 0 but still have
(x1, p1+δ) ∈ T1. By noticing that both U(x, p) and P (x, p, x′)
are increasing in p. We know that both U(x1, p1 + δ) and
U(x∗2, P2(x1, p1 + δ, x
∗
2))) are strictly larger than U(x1, p1)
and U(x∗2, P2(x1, p1, x∗2))). This contradicts the assumption
that it was optimal before, thus, we know that the optimal
contract for (x1, p1) must be on the two lines (the upper
boundary of T1) defined in Theorem 1. Then we can exclude
the possibility of having (x1, p1) on the boundary of T1 with
x1 > x
∗
1 by comparing the contract (x∗1, b1) with such a
contract.
E[U(C)] = r1U(x1, p1) + r2U(x2, P2(x1, p1, x
∗
2))
= r1U(x1, b1) + r2U(x
∗
2, b2 −
x1
x∗2
(b2 − b1))
= r1x1(b1 − c) + r2x
∗
2(b2 −
x1
x∗2
(b2 − b1)− c)
∂E[U(C)]
∂x1
= r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1)
The x1 acheiving the optimal contract C is given by,
x1 =
{
0 if r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) < 0
x∗1 if r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) > 0
C =
{
{max2} if r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) < 0
{max1, (x
∗
2, b2 −
x∗
1
x∗
2
(b2 − b1))} o.w.
This result shows two operating regimes: 1) When r1
r2
<
b2−b1
b1−c
, type-2 is more profitable and the seller will distribute
max2. In this case there is no way to distribute another
contract for type-1 without affecting the behavior of type-
2. Consequently, the seller only distributes one contract. 2)
When r1
r2
> b2−b1
b1−c
, type-1 is more profitable and the seller
will distribute max1. After choosing max1, the seller can also
choose (x∗2, b2 −
x∗
1
x∗
2
(b2 − b1)) for the type-2 buyer without
affecting the type-1 buyer’s choice. As a result, the seller
distributes a pair of contracts to get the most profit. The
optimal contract for x∗1 > x∗2 can be determined with a similar
argument.
Again, we can prove that the optimal contract must have
8p1 = b1 and x1 ≤ x∗1. The difference is that when x∗1 > x∗2, the
expression for (x∗2, P2(x1, p1, x∗2)) has two cases depending on
whether x1 > x∗2 or x1 ≤ x∗2.
E[U(C)] ={
r1U(x1, b1) + r2U(x
∗
2, b2 −
x1
x∗
2
(b2 − b1)) if x1 ≤ x∗2
r1U(x1, b1) + r2U(x
∗
2,
x1b1
x∗
2
) if x1 > x∗2
∂E[U(C)]
∂x1
=
{
r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) if x1 ≤ x∗2
r1(b1 − c) + r2b1 if x1 > x∗2
To summarize, when r1(b1−c)−r2(b2−b1) > 0, E[R(C)] is
strictly increasing in x1 and we know that x1 = x∗1 maximizes
the expected profit. When r1(b1−c)−r2(b2−b1) < 0, E[R(C)]
is decreasing in x1 if x1 ∈ [0, x∗2] and increasing in x1 if
x1 ∈ [x
∗
2, x
∗
1]. We can only conclude that either x1 = 0 or
x1 = x
∗
1 maximizes the expected profit.
x1 =
{
0 or x∗1 if r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) < 0
x∗1 if r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) > 0
C ={
max2/{max1, (x∗2,
x∗
1
b1
x∗
2
)} if r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) < 0
{max1, (x
∗
2,
x∗
1
b1
x∗
2
)} if r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) > 0
In the first condition, we can calculate the expected profit of
the two contract sets and pick the one with the higher profit.
B. K buyer types, K > 2
The previous section gives the explicit solution to the
contract design problem when K = 2. When K > 2 we
no longer have explicit solutions; even numerically searching
for the optimal contract set becomes very complicated. For
instance, even if we assume that both x and p are from discrete
sets, with X and P possible values, respectively, the search
must be done over the space of all possible sets of K different
contracts, on the order of (XP )K . In general X and P both
take on real values, making the search space uncountable. In
order to reduce the complexity we will need to exploit special
properties of the problem. We first reindex the buyer types
such that b1 ≤ ... ≤ bK , under certain conditions we will
determine a procedure which finds the optimal contract.
Definition 2. The buyer types are said to satisfy a mono-
tonicity condition (MC), if ∀i, j, bi ≤ bj implies x∗i ≤ x∗j .
(Remember we will reindexed the types so that b1 ≤ ... ≤ bK
and thus x∗1 ≤ ... ≤ x∗K )
This monotonicity condition (MC) says that the amount a
buyer willing to buy is strictly increasing in the quality it gets
from buying the secondary spectrum. This condition leads to
special properties which allows us to construct simpler ways
to find the optimal contracts.
Theorem 8. When the MC is satisfied, bi ≤ bj and x < x′
implies Pi(x′, p′, x) ≥ Pj(x′, p′, x).
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Theorem 9. When the MC is satisfied, bi ≤ bj and x > x′
implies Pi(x′, p′, x) ≤ Pj(x′, p′, x).
Proof: The proofs for Theorem 8 and Theorem 9 are
moved to the Appendix.
Lemma 6. When the MC is satisfied, the optimal contract
such that type i buyer picks (xi, pi) for all i must have x1 ≤
... ≤ xK .
Proof: Let (xi, pi) denote the contract designed for the
type i buyer. Consider now the contract for the type j buyer
where bj < bi and xj > xi. From Theorem 9 we know that
Pj(xi, pi, xj) ≤ Pi(xi, pi, xj) when the MC is satisfied. This
implies that whatever pj we determined, if the type j buyer
prefers (xj , pj) over (xi, pi) then the type i buyer must think
the same way. From the IC constraint, the type j buyer has to
prefer the (xj , pj) over (xi, pi). Thus, we must have xj ≤ xi
in the optimal contract where each type of buyer selects its
own designated contract.
Lemma 7. When the MC is satisfied, the optimal contract
must have xi ≤ x∗i ∀i = 1...K .
Proof: Proof by contradiction. Consider some optimal
contract having xi > x∗i , we show that replacing xi = x∗i
is actually better. By Theorem 10, we know that pi =
Pi(xi−1, pi−1, xi) and by definition of Pi it is better off
to the seller by providing x∗i instead if we only consider
the profit from the type i buyer. Now, by Theorem 8
Pi+1(xi, pi, x
∗
i ) ≤ Pi(xi, pi, x
∗
i ). Also, because Pi(x′, p′, x)
is a strictly increasing function in p′. The price pi+1 is strictly
higher for assigning x∗i instead of xi. This results in every
pj j > i is strictly increased and the payoff change must
be positive. The only question is whether we can assign x∗i
without affecting the contracts (xj , pj) j < i. The answer is if
∀j < i xj ≤ x
∗
j we can do it. By mathematical induction, we
can again prove that for all i = 1...K xi ≤ x∗i . An example
is illustrated in Figure 6.
This result allows us to restrict our search for the optimal
contract to the set where xi ≤ x∗i . We can further simplify our
search by expressing the values pi, ∀i = 1...K as functions
of xi ∀i = 1...K , by the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Given a set x1 ≤ ... ≤ xK , define (x0, p0) =
(0, 0) and find the contracts (xi, pi) = (xi, Pi(xi−1, pi−1, xi))
in the order i = 1...K . When the MC is satisfied this procedure
produces a contract set that maximizes the seller’s profit,
where each type-i buyer accepts (xi, pi).
9Proof:
1) Each buyer of type i picks (xi, pi).
Induction hypothesis: At each step, when we pick con-
tract (xi, pi) ∀i = 0...K , each buyer type-j with j < i
prefers contract (xj , pj) and each buyer type-j with
j ≥ i prefers contract (xi, pi).
a) Base Case: When picking (x0, p0) = (0, 0), it is
clear that each buyer type is greater than 0 and each
buyer prefers the only contract that is the same as
(as good as) not buying.
b) Assume the induction hypothesis is true when
picking (xi, pi), we will show that the hypothesis is
also true for (xi+1, pi+1). Assume the hypothesis
is true for step i means we have determined the
contracts ((x1, p1), ..., (xi, pi)) and a type-j buyer
(j ≤ i) prefers (xj , pj) over other contracts, while
a type-j buyer (j > i) prefers the ith contract over
all contracts.
pi+1 = (xi+1, Pi+1(xi, pi, xi+1))
By Theorem. 9 and xi+1 > xi, ∀j ≤ i
pi+1 = Pi+1(xi, pi, xi+1) ≥ Pj(xi, pi, xi+1)
The contract (xi+1, pi+1) is above the equal cost
line of the contract (xi, pi) for buyer type less
than or equal to i. Which means they prefer the
ith contract over the i + 1th contract. But from
step i, they prefer their own contract over existing
contracts. Thus, buyer j (j ≤ i) prefers (xj , pj)
over all contracts. By Theorem. 8 and xi+1 > xi,
∀j ≥ i+ 1
pi+1 = Pi+1(xi, pi, xi+1) ≤ Pj(xi, pi, xi+1)
Thus, the contract (xi+1, pi+1) is below the equal
cost line of the contract (xi, pi) for buyer type
j > i. Which means they prefer (xi+1, pi+1) over
(xi, pi). But from step i, they prefer the (xi, pi)
contract over all existing contracts. This shows that
the hypothesis is true for step i+ 1.
c) By Mathematical Induction, the hypothesis is true
for all i ≤ K .
2) This process results in the highest profit.
Since the x′is are fixed, the only way one could increase
the buyer’s profit is to increase one of the pi’s. We will
show that this is not possible. Assume there exists some
contract with the contract set (x1, p′1)...(xK , p′K) with
some p′i > pi, by the increasing property of Pi (Lemma
2) we need p′i−1 > pi−1 to insure that type-i buyer picks
(xi, p
′
i). By induction, we can show that it must be that
(p′1 > p1). Since p1 = P1(0, 0, x1) = b1, (x1, p1) is
already on the boundary of acceptance region of the
type-1 buyer. Thus, any contract with some p′i > pi
is not a contract where each buyer accepts its own
designated contract.
Figure 6 shows an example of applying this theorem with
three buyer types: given x1 = 2, x2 = 4, x3 = 6, pi is
sequentially determined on the equal-cost line of the previous
contract. With Lemma 7, the equal cost line can be restricted
to the form Pi(xi−1, pi−1, xi) = bi − xi−1xi (bi − pi−1). The
expected profit of the seller can now be expressed as:
E[R(C)] = max
x1,..,xK
r1x1(b1 − c)
+ ...+ rixi(pi − c) + ...+ rKxK(pK − c)
= max
x1≤...≤xK
r1x1(b1 − c) + ...+ rixi(Pi(xi−1, pi−1, xi)− c)
+ ...+ rKxK(PK(xK−1, pK−1, xK)− c)
By plugging in the values of pi = Pi(xi−1, pi−1, xi) = bi −
xi−1
xi
(bi − pi−1) recursively. Each term in the optimization
problem can be simplified to
rixi(pi − c) = ri(xi(bi − c)−
i−1∑
j=1
xj(bj+1 − bj))
By simplifying and separate the terms with respect to xi, the
expected profit of the seller can be expressed as,
E[R(C)] = max
x1≤...≤xK
K∑
i=1
xi

ri(bi − c)− (bi+1 − bi) K∑
j=i+1
rj


Firstly, we observe that the above expression is linear in every
xi. Thus differentiating with respect to xi we get a constant:
∂E[R(C)]
∂xi
= ri(bi − c)−
K∑
j=i+1
rj(bi+1 − bi)
Secondly, because the term ∂E[R(C)]
∂xi
does not depend on any
xj , the optimizer can be easily determined. When ∂E[R(C)]∂xi >
0 we want to make xi as large as possible (≤ x∗i ); when
∂E[R(C)]
∂xi
< 0 we want to make xi as small as possible. This
leads us to the following algorithm which finds the optimal set
of (x1, ..., xK). The variable LD (Last Determined) below is
used to keep track of the last type for which we have already
determined its value.
Step 1 . Since ∂E[R(C)]
∂xK
= rK(bK − c) > 0, let xK = x∗K .
Set LD = K , i = K − 1. Go to Step 2.
Step 2 . π := (bi − c)
∑LD−1
j=i rj − (bi+1 − bi)
∑K
j=LD rj .
If i equals to 1 go to Step 5; else if π > 0, go to
Step 3; else if π ≤ 0, go to Step 4.
Step 3 . Set xj = x∗i (∀i ≤ j < LD). Let LD = i, i := i−1.
Go to Step 2.
Step 4 . Let i := i− 1. Go to Step 2.
Step 5 . If π > 0, let xj = x∗1 (∀ 1 ≤ j < LD), else let
xj = 0(∀ 1 ≤ j < LD). Terminate.
This algorithm works as follows: We start from determining
the value of xK , then we determine xK−1 and so on all the
way to x1. At step i we take the derivative with respect to xi.
If it is better to maximize it, we assign it to be x∗i . If it is
better to minimize it, we push the value to xi−1 (which we
have not determined). However, we have to add the probability
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of occurrence ri to the value (xi−1) we pushed to so that it
reflects the weight of occurrence when determining the value
xi−1. Once we determined the value for some xi, every xj
previously pushed to it will be assigned the same value.
Together with Theorem 10 the above algorithm produces
a set of (xi, pi)’s that’s optimal under the monotonicity
condition. This algorithm takes exactly K steps to find the
optimal contract set. While calculating the
∑
ri might also
take K steps, with careful calculation the method can still be
completed in O(K) time. By comparison, an exhaustive search
method will take O((XP )K) time to find the optimal contract
even if we discretize the search space of x and p with X and
P possible values. When x and p are continuos, an exhaustive
search might not even be possible.
VI. DISCUSSION
a) A seller with limited resource: Our analysis so far
has been based on the assumption that the seller has sufficient
bandwidth to fulfill all accepted contracts. We now discuss
what happens when the seller’s resources are limited. In the
full information case when the seller knows the type of each of
a group of potential buyers, it will extract the most by offering
(bi, x
∗
i ) to a buyer of type i. Under a resource constraint, it
will select a set of contracts S to maximize
∑
i∈S bix
∗
i s.t.∑
i∈S bi does not exceed the limit. Because the seller can
offer any 0 < x < x∗i (when p is set to bi), this becomes
a form of the continuous (fractional) knapsack problem. This
problem is solvable by a greedy algorithm [14]. When the
seller does not know the buyers’ types, the resulting problem
is a similar constrained optimization using type distribution
information.
b) Comparing to auction: Auction has been used ex-
tensively for the allocation of spectrum on the traditional,
wholesale market, and has been proposed for the secondary
market as well, see e.g., [3]–[5]. Auction is a mechanism
aimed at extracting profit from the sale of rare goods for
which potential buyers’ valuation is unknown and can be very
hard to obtain. The contract mechanism studied in this paper
may be view as a form of sale by posted price. Compared to
auction, posted price is more often used in the sale of multiple
(and potentially large quantity of) similar goods, the valuation
of which is obtained through market research [15]. Since the
cost spent on market research can be amortized over multiple
goods, posted price sale can be more efficient than auction
which incurs cost in conducting each single auction [16]. It has
been shown that under ideal conditions the two are equivalent
in profit generation [17]. As more and more license holders
may be interested in the secondary market, we believe pricing
schemes like the contracts studied in this paper offers a valid
alternative to spectrum auction.
c) Learning buyer types and continuous type distribution:
We have assumed in our analysis that the seller knows a priori
the buyer distribution and that this distribution is discrete. This
knowledge can be obtained through online learning, where a
stream of buyers arrive and the seller offer contracts designed
not only to make profit (exploit) but also to learn the buyer
type distribution (explore) by observing whether the contract is
accepted or rejected. This can be cast as a multi-armed bandit
problem with an independent reward process (assuming buyers
are independently drawn from a distribution), and potentially a
continuum of arms (each contract is an arm under this model)
if the buyer types follow a continuous distribution. Algorithms
exist in the literature that produce sublinear regret (defined as
the profit difference between the best single contract and the
algorithm) in time [18], and logarithmic regret in time when
the number of arms is finite [19].
VII. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this section we compare the performance of contracts
generated by the following methods:
1) The optimal set of M contracts (denoted OPT(M) in
the figures) : Finding this set is done by an exhaustive
search over a set of discretized values x and p as an
approximation of the uncountable choices (the step size
for x is 0.5 and the step size for p is 0.1). As discussed
earlier in Section V-B, the complexity increases expo-
nentially in M . This restricts us to run at most M = 2
in our evaluation.
2) The algorithm we introduced in the previous section
(denoted ALG in the figures): As previously shown,
ALG is optimal when the monotonicity condition holds.
Since the complexity of this algorithm increases only
linearly in M , M can be on the order of thousands in
our numerical evaluation.
3) A K-choose-1 method (denoted MAX in the fig-
ures): This is the method that selects the con-
tract with the highest expected profit over the set
{max1,max2, · · · ,maxK}: maximize
maxi,i=1...K
E[U(maxi)].
This is done by checking all (bi, x∗i ) pairs; the com-
plexity increases linearly in M .
The experiments are run by increasing K = 1...7. For each
K value the parameters (qi, bi, ǫi, ri) are independently and
randomly generated from uniform distributions (bi ∈ [0, 1],
qi ∈ [0, 10], ǫi ∈ [0, 2] and ri ∈ [0, 1] but normalized such
that
∑
ri = 1) For each K we record the average (in expected
profit) over 12000 randomly generated cases; these are plotted
in Figure 7. We repeat the same but only for cases that satisfy
the monotonicity condition; results are shown in Figure 8.
Our observations are as follows. Being able to use more
contracts is always better as expected (i.e., OPT(1) ≤ OPT(2)
in all cases). When the monotonicity condition holds, ALG is
optimal and thus outperforms all other algorithms. When K =
1, 2 OPT(2) should have been optimal but it falls below ALG
due to the discretization error. When K > 2, ALG further
has the advantage of being able to use more than 2 contracts.
Recall that MAX is the optimal contract when the seller knows
exactly the type; thus, MAX is optimal when K = 1 and
outperforms exhaustive search because it does not suffer from
discretization error. In the general case when the monotonicity
does not necessarily hold, although ALG is not always optimal
it still outperforms both OPT(1) and OPT(2). Finally, when the
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Fig. 7. Simulation results of the sellers profit versus different contracts in
the general case
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Fig. 8. Simulation results of the sellers profit versus different contracts when
increasing property holds
buyer type is harder to predict (as K increases), the maximum
expected profit decreases.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We considered a contract design problem where a primary
license holder wishes to profit from its excess spectrum
capacity by selling it to potential secondary users/buyers
via designing a set of profitable contracts. We completely
characterize the optimal solution in the cases where there is a
single buyer type, and when multiple types of buyers share a
common, known channel condition. In the case when each type
of buyers have different channel conditions we construct an
algorithm that generates a set of contracts in a computationally
efficient manner, and show that this set is optimal when the
buyer types satisfy a monotonicity condition.
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APPENDIX
Theorem. 9
Proof:
Case 1x′ ≤ x∗i ≤ x∗j
When x′ ≤ x∗i and x′ ≤ x∗j , the equal cost lines for
x < x′ are of the form,
Pi(x
′, p′, x) = bi −
qi − ǫi − δi
x
Pj(x
′, p′, x) = bj −
qj − ǫj − δj
x
where we let δi = Ci(x′, p′) and δj = Cj(x′, p′).
Take the derivatives with respect to x.
∂Pi(x
′, p′, x)
∂x
= (qi − ǫi − δi)x
−2
∂Pj(x
′, p′, x)
∂x
= (qj − ǫj − δj)x
−2
By definition, Pi(x′, p′, x′) = p′ = Pj(x′, p′, x′),
p′ = bi −
qi − ǫi − δi
x′
= bj −
qj − ǫj − δj
x′
Considering bi < bj , we know that qj − ǫj − δj >
qi−ǫi−δi. Which implies ∂Pj(x
′,p′,x)
∂x
≥ ∂Pi(x
′,p′,x)
∂x
,
and thus Pi(x′, p′, x) ≥ Pj(x′, p′, x), ∀x < x′.
Case 2x∗i ≤ x′ ≤ x∗j
The equal cost lines are,
Pi(x
′, p′, x) =
{
x′p′
x
x∗i ≤ x ≤ x
′
bi −
qi−ǫi−δi
x
x ≤ x∗i
Pj(x
′, p′, x) = bj −
qj−ǫj−δj
x
x ≤ x′
12
Where δi = Ci(x′, p′) and δj = Cj(x′, p′). Taking
the derivatives,
P ′i (x
′, p′, x) =
{
−x′p′x−2 < 0 xi∗ ≤ x ≤ x′
(qi − ǫi − δi)x
−2 > 0 x ≤ xi∗
P ′j(x
′, p′, x) = (qj − ǫj − δj)x
−2 > 0 x ≤ x′
This implies Pi(x′, p′, x) > Pj(x′, p′, x), ∀x x∗i ≤
x ≤ x′.
Pi(x
′, p′, x∗i ) = bi −
qi − ǫi − δi
x∗i
> Pj(x
′, p′, x∗i ) = bj −
qj − ǫj − δj
x∗i
Since bi < bj , we conclude that qj−ǫj−δj ≥ qi−ǫi−
δi. Which indicates that ∂Pj(x
′,p′,x)
∂x
≥ ∂pi(x
′,p′,x)
∂x
and Pi(x′, p′, x) ≥ Pj(x′, p′, x), ∀x ≤ x∗i .
Case 3x′ ≥ x∗j ≥ x∗i
When x ≥ x∗j ≥ x∗i , the equal cost line of both
types follow x′p′ = xp. Thus, Pi(x′, p′, x∗j ) =
Pj(x
′, p′, x∗j ). Then the case falls into Case 2 and
Pi(x
∗
j , Pj(x
′, p′, x∗j ), x) ≥ Pj(x
∗
j , Pj(x
′, p′, x∗j ), x),
∀x < x∗j .
Theorem. 8
Proof:
Case 1x′ ≤ x∗i ≤ x∗j
When x′ ≤ x∗i ≤ x∗j , both types have equal utiliy
line of the same form.
Pi(x
′, p′, x) = bi −
qi − ǫi − Ci(x
′, p′)
x
Pi(x
′, p′, x) = bj −
qj − ǫj − Cj(x
′, p′)
x
(5)
By exactly the same argument as in Theorem. 9 we
can find out that. ∂Pj(x
′,p′,x)
∂x
≥ ∂pi(x
′,p′,x)
∂x
, and thus,
Pi(x
′, p′, x) ≤ Pj(x
′, p′, x) ∀x∗i ≥ x ≥ x
′
When x∗i < x < x∗j , while Pj(x′, p′, x) still follows
the same formula (Equation. 5), Pi(x′, p′, x) starts
to decrease by following the line Pi(x′, p′, x) =
x′Pi(x
′, p′, x∗i )/x. Thus,
Pi(x
′, p′, x) ≤ Pj(x
′, p′, x) ∀x∗i ≤ x ≤ x
∗
j
When x > x∗j , both i, j follow the form
P (x′, p′, x) = P (x′, p′, x∗j )/x. But Pi(x′, p′, x∗j ) ≤
Pj(x
′, p′, x∗j ), they never cross and Pj(x′, p′, x) ≥
Pi(x
′, p′, x) ∀x > x∗j .
Case 2x∗i < x′ < x∗j
When x∗i < x′ < x < x∗j they are of the form,
Pi(x
′, p′, x) =
x′p′
x
Pj(x
′, p′, x) = bj −
qj − ǫj − Cj(x
′, p′)
x
respectively. By the same argument as in Theorem.
9, Pi is decreasing while Pj is increasing. Thus,
Pi(x
′, p′, x∗j ) ≤ Pj(x
′, p′, x∗j ). When x > x∗j ,
Pi(x
′, p′, x) =
x∗jPi(x
′, p′, x∗j )
x
Pj(x
′, p′, x) =
x∗jPj(x
′, p′, x∗j )
x
Since Pi(x′, p′, x∗j ) < Pj(x′, p′, x∗j ) we konw that
Pi(x
′, p′, x) < Pj(x
′, p′, x) ∀x > x∗j .
Case 3x′ > x∗j > x∗i
When x > x∗j , both types have equal cost line as
xp = x′p′. Thus, Pi(x′, p′, x) = Pj(x′, p′, x) ∀x >
x∗j .
